Abstract-Security is crucial in service composition. Any changes made to the composition may result in undesirable security properties for the composed system. An effective monitoring and analysis mechanism is needed to protect the dynamically changing service composition at run-time. This paper introduces a modelling platform that allows the demonstration and testing of secure service composition as the composition develops over time. With its graphical user interface, participating services and their relationships are easily monitored and analysed. A script composition language is also explained in the paper. It has been used to implement security policies for the service composition.
I. INTRODUCTION
A service-oriented architecture (SOA) provides the opportunity for services from different providers to work together [10] . A particularly powerful capability of SOAs is their ability to offer new applications via composition of services; facilitated by standardised interoperations among services. However, in addition to the intended outcomes, composition also introduces the potential for unexpected or emergent behaviour, resulting in new uncertainties, especially in the area of security. This danger is particularly acute in dynamic environments, where recomposition can occur midexecution. One of the great challenges of secure service composition is therefore to analyse and ensure the security of the composition at run-time [6] .
In SOAs, services can join or leave a composition at any time, due to unavailability or breach of contract. Hence the topology and relationships of services may change all the time. Service behaviour may also differ owing to differing implementations and their various security properties (e.g. the host system's status). Thus a simple substitution of a service may result in dramatic changes of the security properties for the entire composition. For example, assume a scenario where Service A uses Blowfish [7] as the encryption algorithm to communicate with other services in a composition. Later on more stringent security requirements are introduced, and a greater strength of encryption is mandated. A replacement Service B is found that satisfies the new security requirement through support for an alternative set of stronger symmetric encryption algorithms. However, it transpires that the only common algorithm supported by Service B and the services it communicates with is 3DES [3] (considered to have similar strength to Blowfish). Thus its communication with other services cannot be satisfactorily secured because the security level offered by these encryption algorithms is lower than what is required by the new security requirements. The entire composition is consequently considered to be vulnerable in terms of confidentiality, even though individually the services all fulfil the requirements. We can see therefore that a dynamically composed system needs real-time monitoring and analysis to ensure its security, and that this must happen at the composition level, rather than focussing on individual services.
In this paper we propose a novel script language for secure service composition. The language is flexible and extensible. With the language it is possible to design various security policies. A specially designed platform enforces these policies in order to support run-time monitoring and analysis of service composition. The run-time platform also offers a graphical user interface, which is easy to understand and use. Together, this work provides a unique framework for analysis and testing of secure service composition. It provides not only proof of concept for research purpose, but also the core module for implementation of practical solutions.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section will introduce the concept and design of the platform. The security policies will be explained in Section III. Section IV discusses the proposed scripting language that used to implement the security policies with an example walkthrough. More implementation and comparison are also made in the same section. Finally the paper concludes with a brief overview and future work in Section V.
II. THE MATTS PLATFORM
The Mobile Agent Topology Test System (MATTS) is a platform that has been designed primarily to allow modelling of system-of-systems scenarios and testing of secure service composition analysis techniques [12] . It supports analysis and verification of various security-associated risks for the composite services. The analysis process is based on a scripting technique. In Section IV we will give more detail about this language, but first we will consider the capabilities of the platform more broadly.
First of all, there is a graphical user interface that allows creating different scenarios. A user can construct a scenario by specifying the used services and their relationships. The term 'relationship' here can be considered in general terms to be abstract, with different relationships annotated using different properties. However, in this particular case the relationship represents the information flow between services. For example, if a navigation service A requires the input from a location service B, their relationship is simply represented as shown in Figure 1 . The arrow represents the flow direction of the location information. In addition, the user can also specify the security properties of an individual service through the interface. These properties will be used to determine the overall security features of the composition.
Behind the user interface, there is a backend engine that analyses the scenario and its properties at runtime. Figure 2 provides a very brief overview of the security property analysis process. This is based on a special scripting language that allows the incorporation of both service properties and the interactions between services to be considered. For example, the script file can specify what kind of encryption algorithm a service should adopt, or which particular service is allowed to make connections. Each script file specifies a set of rules that determines whether the composition satisfies a particular security property. Once a script is loaded, the engine will measure the scenario against its rules. If the measurement result indicates a violation of a rule, the engine will notify the user. This process repeats every time when the scenario evolves and it only ends when order received to stop. As scenarios in MATTS allow evolution and change at runtime, the properties and connections between services are dynamically analysed to determine the security properties of the overall service composition. It is worth to notice that the analysis process does not distinguish between modelled and real nodes or services. Hence, MATTS allows scenarios to be created interactively and comprised of a mixture of both real and virtual nodes and/or services. The CompositionClient is another part of the MATTS system that runs on PCs or Windows Mobile/Pocket PC devices and allows them to interface with the MATTS server via the network. It allows for the properties of a device to be assigned, for connections to be made to the server, and then for the execution of certain network operations such as sending data between nodes (either real or modelled). CompositionClient nodes also appear in the MATTS interface and can be manipulated in the same way as the modelled services. The properties of both the modelled and real nodes are incorporated into the analysis process. In other words, MATTS provides an emulation environment with both real and virtual nodes. The MATTS server acts as the central analysis tool and provides a visualisation of the network structure. Figure 3 shows part of the CompositionClient interface as it appears on a PC and a mobile device.
III. SECURITY POLICIES
In this section we describe concept of the security policies that used to represent security needs in MATTS and give some examples developed by the authors. After constructing the scenario (services and their relationships; in this case the network topology), we use the security policies to define rules that the composite service has to comply with. The backend engine of MATTS analyses the service scenario against these policies.
A. Concept and Benefits
In MATTS a security policy (hereafter referred to as a policy) describes a certain configuration of services that leads to either a secure or insecure situation occurring for the composition. One policy file normally focuses on one aspect of a security issue, such as privacy or confidentiality.
Consider a situation as depicted in Figure 4 : a service provider composes three services (S 1 , S 2 and S 3 ) to provide a composite service for its user. Service S 2 provides an access point for users to logon and interacts with S 1 and S 3 to implement certain tasks. In this case, a secured access point to S 2 is enough to protect the composite service as a whole. To prove that S 2 is able to provide such satisfactory protection, several security properties of the service S 2 , such as encryption algorithm used, strength of firewall, and up to date status of anti-virus software, will be examined to confirm the level of its security.
Extending this example, assume that service S 3 is later able to provide direct access to the users in order to enrich the provided service range. Then the same requirements will be applied to S 3 in order to have consistent security settings for the entire composition.
Therefore, to enforce secure access (a security policy) in a composition, the secure access policy consists of two steps, as follows.
1) Find all the services that offer direct access to the user.
2) Those services identified in Step 1 must have their access points properly secured; i.e., satisfy a set of security requirements in relation to secure access. A policy is considered as successfully imposed only when all its steps are followed and all the specified requirements fulfilled. Because the situation may change over time (such as the example of service S 3 in the previous case), the policy has to be enforced to the right services as the system evolves. Therefore, policy checking is likely a continuously looped process.
Together, one or more policies might be applied at the same time to form a more comprehensive security checklist, which is similar to a rule-based system: composite services have to fulfil a certain number, if not all, of security policies to achieve a certain level of security.
One of the benefits of utilising security policies is that they allow independent setting and testing. The policies are expected to be applicable in all the scenarios. By simply loading and running a policy, a result will be returned indicating whether the composite service satisfies the policy. In addition, suggestions can be made for correction as well. For example, if the process finds that an access point is not secure due to lack of firewall protection, the threat can be mitigated by applying an additional firewall service to the composition.
In general, there are a number of suggestion types that can be made, depending on the application:
• Rearranging the components.
• Introducing new components (or removing some of the existing components).
• Enclosing one or more of the components using a wrapper.
• Reconfiguring one or more of the components (e.g., changing its execution parameters).
• Directly adapting the code, for example using aspect weaving.
Besides, performing an analysis along these lines can be helpful not only for ensuring that security is enforced when necessary, but also for ensuring that security measures are not applied when they are unnecessary. For example, if service S 3 in Figure 4 stops offering direct access to the users, its firewall will become unnecessary and can be removed until the situation changes again.
B. Policy Examples 1) Data flow analysis:
Data access is a security issue that concerns most information systems. It is one of the main objectives for deployment of security services. Weak access control can cause severe consequences such as information leakage or data integrity issues. The situation gets more complicated as services from different providers need to work together. Separate services from different domains may apply data access control in different -and often incompatible -ways. As a simple example, a pair of interacting services, where one applies Bell-La Padula (for confidentiality) [4] , while the other applies Biba (for integrity) [5] , is liable to result in a system that suffers from the following:
• Service failures (neither service can operate).
• Security failures (data confidentiality and/or integrity is compromised).
• Other undesired behaviours. For example, a service applying Bell-La Padula will operate a 'no read-up' rule in order to ensure users cannot read data for which they have insufficient security clearance. Suppose an intruder wishes to circumvent this rule, in order to release a particular piece of data to a co-conspirator with low clearance level. In this case, he or she might transmit the data to a service operating the Biba model, which by contrast will be applying rules that prevent writing up or reading down (in order to ensure information isn't contaminated with other data originating from sources with lower clearance level). On this service the intruder could write the data down to a file with lower clearance level, thereby providing access to someone who would have been blocked on the original service.
While there are models for safely combining Bell-La Padula and Biba models [8] , this example nonetheless illustrates how, without due care in applying an alternative model, naive composition can result in security vulnerabilities. More generally, applying different data access control methods in different configurations is likely to result in potentially complex interactions with unexpected and undesirable consequences.
To prevent this issue, a 'sensitivity level' can be predefined for all parties and their properties [11] . It is especially useful in a situation where participant services are known in advance. The script runs in the background and checks the actual data flows in operation. This can be achieved by implementing software agent such as the CompositionClient at the service and monitoring its inputs and outputs. The principle here is to ensure that throughout the entire period when the services are composed, sensitive data with a certain level of sensitivity can only flow to services with a higher or matching sensitivity level. In this way, the confidentiality of the sensitive data is protected from access by untrustworthy services. Although these processes can be based on formally defined and proven security results, they can be considered in general as being more heuristic than formal, allowing dynamic application at runtime.
2) The weakest link principle: There are some cases when the weakest link principle is particularly applicable to service composition. It states that when services are composed together, the security capability of the composite service is equal to that offered by the weakest component service. In some cases it might even be less than that of the weakest link as discussed in the access control compliance example above. This secure policy is applicable to many security properties. For example, when encryption is used for communications between services, the services may adopt different encryption algorithms or key lengths which give them different encryption strengths. In order to communicate with each other, the service with an advanced encryption algorithm may have to degrade its encryption strength during the composition. Thus the composite service literally has a 'weakest link' in its encryption strategy.
Similarly, the weakest link principle applies to reputation and other security aspects; i.e. a service with low reputation affects the entire composition. For example, a weather forecast service composition is used by an air traffic controller. The composition consists of three services: wind conditions, rain/snow likelihood, and temperature. The reputation of the rain/snow likelihood provider goes down; thus, the entire forecast becomes unreliable.
In MATTS, the weakest link principle can be used to determine the security capacity of the composed application or can work as a filter on behalf of the end user. The script here may simply state that only services satisfying certain requirements or security capacity are allowed to join the composition.
It should be noted however that the weakest link principle is not universally applicable. There are security cases where alterations to a service composition can be utilised to improve the security of a composite service to be greater than that of the weakest component. An example might be a firewall service used to shield an otherwise vulnerable service from outside attack. The use of the firewall mitigates the vulnerability exposed by the weaker service. As pointed out above, it may also apply in reverse: the introduction of a component may serve as an exacerbating factor that reduces the security of the overall composition to a degree beyond that posed by the service were it to act in isolation. This often results from interactions between incompatible security properties.
3) Boundary check: The boundary check policy corresponds to the common network security paradigm of creating a secure boundary around an internal network, inside which security can be less rigorously enforced. The boundary is often enforced using, for example, a firewall or intrusion detection service.
The difficulty with this arrangement is that as composition of services increases flexibility, the composition's boundaries become increasingly dynamic and blurred as users benefit from access to a wider variety of the composed resources.
Rather than providing a finite number of pre-specified access points or gateways to the composition as is the traditional case, the boundary check policy therefore aims to dynamically assess the boundary of the composition as it changes [12] .
In MATTS, every time a new service connects to a third party, e.g., external entities, the topology of the services is analysed to assess whether the boundary of the composition has changed. And if so, check that the boundary conforms to the policy's requirement (e.g., is service B running a firewall?). Thus under certain circumstances, such as when service A has sufficient security, changes in the boundary may be perfectly acceptable and can be allowed in a dynamic way.
In terms of correction, if the boundary changes and it is established that the resulting topology is not sufficiently secure at the new boundary edge, then the new connection would simply be refused (or in our current implementation the user would be warned so that they can close the connection).
All the security policies described in this section can be encoded using our script composition language. This is machine readable by the MATTS backend engine. In the next section, we will explain the syntax of this language with an example walkthrough of a simple script file.
IV. THE COMPOSE LANGUAGE A. Design of the Language
The Compose XML language has been set up as a declarative programming language, most similar to logic programming. This contrasts it with the more common imperative programming techniques that are used, for example, in procedural or most common object oriented languages. In such languages the execution flow is defined explicitly by the computer program.
In Compose, the program flow is defined by the component structure being analysed. This can be seen as logic programming in reverse. In logic programming, the program doesn't define the execution flow; instead this flow is chosen by the compiler or interpreter of the program either at compile or run time. In Compose, this flow is decided rather by the component structure. If the structure represents a valid flow through the Compose script, then the structure is considered to satisfy the script. If on the other hand it is not a valid execution flow, then the structure fails to satisfy the script. This is one of the reasons we consider it to be a template -the process involves checking whether a topology matches against a possible program flow. However, unlike a static or fully-specified topology to match against, the Compose language allows either finite or infinite sets of finite or infinite topologies to be specified. More precisely, Table I AN EXAMPLE OF A SIMPLE COMPOSE XML SCRIPT <?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1" stand -alone="no"?> /<!DOCTYPE compose PUBLIC "http://www. * * * . com/PUCsec/dtds/compose.dtd" "compose.dtd"> <compose type="standard"> <sandbox id="s1" config="c1">Single component check</sandbox> <configuration id="c1"> <component id="c2"> <input format=""/> <output format=""/> </component> </configuration> </compose>
Compose allows any recursively definable set of topologies to be specified.
In this way we can see the script as a template that defines a wide class of possible executions. If the component structure in questions represents one of the potentially many valid execution paths through the script, then the script is satisfied.
The way this works must be considered at all times when creating Compose XML scripts, since it has important consequences that affect the way scripts are understood.
B. A Compose File Walkthrough
In this section, we describe the Compose language used to implement the security policies. We will not describe the full syntax of the language, but it may be useful to consider what a complete script might look like. There are a number of additions beyond those already described that are needed to fully define any XML document. These are necessary, but are not really part of the syntax of a Compose script itself. An example of a very simple Compose script is shown in Table I , which will be satisfied by any single component that has no inputs or outputs.
The first two lines in the file specify the encoding and document type. The document type is identified by the http://www. * * * .com/PUCsec/dtds/compose.dtd identifier, which is a URL pointing to the Document Type Definition file for the Compose language. These two lines should be included in every Compose file and can remain static.
The highest-level element is the <compose> element that encapsulates the entire remainder of the file. The opening tag contains the attribute type="standard". There are two potential values for this attribute: standard, and extended.
The standard type is the non-Turing complete format, which doesn't allow the use of the <process> tag and therefore has the benefit of being decidable (all scripts are guaranteed to halt). In a standard file no component node will be visited more than once, which prevents endless loops from occurring.
The extended type is Turing complete and allows the <process> tag, and also allows component nodes to be visited multiple times. The result is that extended scripts are far more powerful, however there are also execution dangers associated with it; the parser may become caught in an endless loop if the script isn't designed carefully to avoid this. It's up to the script designer to prevent this from happening, by implementing a means for processing to halt if a component node has already been visited if necessary.
Every file must have a <compose> element that specifies whether the format is standard or extended. The rest of the file must reside inside the start and end <compose> and </compose> tags.
Next in the example we see a sandbox declaration. Each Compose script may contain any number of sandbox properties to check for. The analysis process will be undertaken for each of these sandbox properties, which are declared by the <sandbox> elements. The text data placed between the start and end <sandbox> tags is the name given to the property and can be anything. This is displayed in the 'Show Results' dialogue box of MATTS so that the property can be easily understood by a human. The tag has two attributes: id and config. The id is a global identifier for the sandbox property which is not currently used. The config attribute is important for establishing how the property will be analysed and must contain an id attribute. This tag must be uniquely associated with the id attribute for a configuration element elsewhere in the script.
In fact, such config attributes are used elsewhere for other tags. In all cases they are used in a similar way to define how the parser should proceed. For example, in the context of the sandbox property tag the attribute tells the parser which <configuration> tag should be moved to in order to analyse the sandbox property. In the context of a component section the attribute tells the parser where it must move to next as it parses the script. This is similar to a 'jump' declaration, except that it may not be adhered to immediately, but is used to establish where the parser should look next for more information when it decides that it needs to.
The next portion of the file is contained within the open and closing <configuration> and </configuration> tags. These tags are used to delimit a self-contained component structure section. Anything contained at this level (i.e. directly inside the compose elements) must be a <sandbox>, <property>, <process> or <configuration> structure. There may be multiple configurations within a single script. In the case of our example, we only have one, and it defines how the "s1" sandbox property should be analysed, which we can see by the correlation between the sandbox property's config attribute and the configuration's id attribute, both of which take the value "c1".
Each configuration section is made up of a number of nested and sequential component sections, delimited by the <component> element. Again, these define the path taken through the component node structure. In essence, nested <component> elements can be taken to mean that the components must connect sequentially in the component structure, satisfying the respective properties of the components' sections at each stage. Sequential component sections can be taken disjunctively. That is, the component structure must satisfy at least one of the component sections. The parser traverses the tree recursively, so that if one of the sections fails to be satisfied by the component structure, it will back track until it does. In essence then, the depth of the elements in the script represents the hierarchy of the elements in the component structure.
Each component section should contain input and output declarations that describe how the component can be satisfied based on its input and output properties. In our example, we have a single <input> element and a single <output> element. Again, if there were multiple of either of these, they would be taken disjunctively, so that the script will be satisfied if any of these input and output declarations are satisfied by the component structure. For the example, the <input> element has the format attribute set to be the empty string. This means that the component section will only be satisfied by a component node with no inputs. There are a number of other possible values that we could have given this attribute. For example, a value of " * " would have been satisfied by any inputs. A value of "id1 id1" would be satisfied only if the node had two inputs both of which satisfy the id1 property. We could even have said "id1 * " to state that any number (0 or more) of inputs are allowed, as long as they all satisfy the id1 property. So, we have seen that the component must have no inputs. Similarly since the format attribute of the <output> element is also an empty string we see that the component must also have no outputs. The format for this is the same as that for the format attribute of the <input> element. As such we could have defined other output attributes similarly.
Hence, looking back at the complete script, we can see that the example defines the set of all component structures that contain only a single node with no inputs or outputs.
C. Implementation and Comparison
By using the MATTS platform and the Compose XML language, we successfully implemented a monitoring environment for the data flow analysis and boundary check policies [11] , [12] . The implementations have been used to demonstrate the principle and importance of secure service composition in various scenarios. These results have shown that the proposed platform and language are robust and accurate. Crucially, the system can react to change of context, e.g. the services' relationships and individual services' security properties, in a very short time. It provides a unique way of analysing and securing a dynamically composed system in real time. Figure 5 and Table II show the example scenario and script file created for the boundary check policy respectively. Table II BOUNDARY CHECK SCRIPT <?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1" stand-alone="no"?> <!DOCTYPE compose PUBLIC "http://www. * * * .com/PUCsec/dtds/compose.dtd" "compose.dtd"> <compose type="extended"> <sandbox id="s3" config="c1">Boundary check</sandbox> <property id="External">External component</property> <configuration id="c1" init="1"> <component> <process action="@ncol[@n][0]"/> <process id="safe" init="1" action="safe=1"/> <process init="0" cond="@a[@n][External]" action="safe=2" config="check"/> <input format="" cond="safe&gt;=1"/> <input format="*" cond="safe&gt;=1"/> <output format="*" config="c1" cond="safe==1"/> <output format="*" follow = "no" cond="safe==2"/> <output format=""/> </component> </configuration> <process id="check"> <process action=" There are a variety of existing tools for performing analysis of individual or composed services. The Deploy [2] tools support formal analysis of security properties, focussing particularly on the design of systems satisfying strict formal specifications. Similarly, AVANTSSAR [1] is a tool for reasoning on service compositions based on a formal language for specifying trust and security properties. The Compose language and MATTS platform developed here do not obviate the need to apply formal methods for analysing services, but instead builds of them, while at the same time aiming to make certain elements (specifically reaction to runtime composition changes) more efficient.
Social-Technical Security Modelling Language and Tool is another set of security modeling tool for the specification of security and trustworthiness requirements of systems operating in a cross-organizational environment [9] . The difference is that the language is built on top of social concepts, such as role, agent, goal, delegation, authorization, etc. The tool is an Eclipse RCP application and supports multi-view modeling. At present however it do not offer the same flexible and extensible techniques that for involving real world appliances in the run-time analysis.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we described a platform that allows the monitoring of scenarios where various services are dynamically combined into a composite system. Apart from providing an easy-to-use graphical user interface that demonstrates the interactions between services, the MATTS platform also includes a Compose language that can define security policies.
The scripting language described here offers a novel approach to allowing the definition of sets of security policies in a way that has been chosen specifically to allow security properties to be tackled with relative ease and efficiency. Unlike more formal methods, MATTS scripts are scalable and allow more heuristic properties to be defined. However, while the scripts can guarantee adherence to a particular policy, the policies themselves must be validated against security properties separately. While there is therefore further work to be done in refining the process on a number of levels, we nonetheless know of no other approach that provides a flexible and realistic way to tackle such a broad range of security properties. Choosing the correct language for specifying secure composition policies to be an important area for investigation, with the potential to build on this work to provide more formal or even provable correlation between the scripts and the security properties being tested against.
The method chosen for encoding policies does not necessarily impact on the types of policies that can be described, as long as the process allows for all computable sets of annotated graphs to be defined. The scripting method is Turing complete and therefore fulfils this requirement. However, inevitably there are some types of policy which are more likely to be relevant for defining security capabilities than others. A more important question is therefore whether the method for describing policies is appropriate for this domain; that is, whether it allows the policies that are likely to be of interest to be defined easily. The current scripting technique is tailored to allow fully specified policies to be created in a straightforward manner, where these policies can be composed together in different ways. However, there are likely more appropriate, understandable ways for encoding the policies and we aim to explore this as part of the future work.
Finally, a further crucial step involves the extension of the current policies for identification into policies for correction. The current scripting process supports detection and identification, but would require extensions to the scripting language, or to the script interpreter, in order to support the ability to provide suggestions for correcting non-compliant service compositions into those that will satisfy a script.
